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1. Understanding ‘corruption’ 
There is a sizeable body of literature that attempts to wrestle with the thorny 
issue of how ‘corruption’ might be defined. There is little need to review it all 
here, though the matter cannot be ignored entirely. What follows is a brief 
outline of why the issue of definition is of some concern, and an outline of the 
key terms used throughout this short review.  
In short, there have been two main ways of approaching the issue of corruption. 
One looks at the different forms of behaviour and attempts to distinguish those 
actions that might be considered corrupt. The second seeks to construct a 
definition that can be used to separate corrupt from non-corrupt acts. In truth 
neither is entirely satisfactory. The problem is that corruption is fundamentally 
an ethical issue. The simple but uncomfortable fact is that complex ethical 
problems are an inherent part of policing. The consequence is that complete 
clarity around conduct is impossible. However, recognising this, and being 
prepared to discuss openly the problems and the complexities necessarily 
involved in policing, is an important part of the process of developing coherent 
administrative policy responses to such issues. 
Even if problematic, however, thinking about the definition of ‘corruption’ is 
nevertheless a necessary element in understanding the issue. One of the 
leading scholars in the field offers the following definition:  
‘Police corruption is an action or omission, a promise of action or 
omission, or an attempted action or omission, committed by a police 
officer or a group of police officers, characterized by the police officer’s 
misuse of the official position, motivated in significant part by the 
achievement of personal gain. (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005: 16).' 
This offers a fairly clear guide to the idea of corruption, containing several key 
facets of such conduct. However, it is overly narrow in one respect, and that is 
its focus on personal gain. Before returning to that issue, and using existing 
work (including Roebuck and Barker, 1974; Punch, 1985; HMIC 2011), it is 
worth looking at the variety of actions that might be included within a general 
categorisation of ‘types’ of corrupt/unethical activity by police officers. A 
reasonably comprehensive overview looks something like this:  
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Type of 
corrupt/unethical 
activity 
Explanation 
Corruption of 
authority 
When an officer receives some form of material gain 
by virtue of their position as a police officer without 
violating the law per se (e.g. free drinks, meals, 
services); misuse of professional perquisites (credit 
cards etc) 
‘Kickbacks’ Receipt of goods, services or money for referring 
business to particular individuals 
Opportunistic theft Stealing from arrestees (sometimes referred to as 
‘rolling’), from traffic accident victims, crime victims 
and the bodies or property of dead citizens. 
‘Shakedowns’ Acceptance of a bribe for not following through a 
criminal violation, i.e. not making an arrest, filing a 
complaint or impounding property. 
Protection of illegal 
activities 
Police protection of those engaged in illegal activities 
(prostitution, drugs, pornography) enabling the 
business to continue operating. 
The ‘fix’ Undermining criminal investigations or proceedings, 
the ‘loss’ of traffic tickets, etc. 
Direct criminal 
activities 
A police officer commits a crime against person or 
property for personal gain ‘in clear violation of both 
departmental and criminal norms’. 
Internal payoffs Prerogatives available to police officers (holidays, shift 
allocations, promotion) are bought, bartered and sold. 
‘Flaking’ or ‘padding’ Planting of, or adding to, evidence (argued by Punch 
to be particularly evident in drugs cases). 
‘Tipoffs’ and 
inappropriate 
information 
disclosure 
Activities ranging from offering advance warning of 
police activities to criminals through to the 
inappropriate release of information to the media 
Inappropriate 
secondary 
business/employment 
interests – post-
Engagement in activities while employed as a police 
officer that might (or be thought to) conflict with 
existing role; taking up employment after leaving the 
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retirement 
employment 
service raising similar ethical questions 
Other forms of 
misconduct 
Brutality; discriminatory practice; drinking on duty etc. 
 
The first question to ask, therefore, is what do the matters above have, largely, 
in common? First, and picking up on Kutnjak Ivkovic’s definition, they all, in 
different ways, involve the abuse of position. They involve some compromise 
of the ‘special trust’ enjoyed by police officers. Such abuse of position may 
involve acts that are illegal – the commission of criminal acts or abusing trust to 
enable or ignore criminal acts – but it is important to recognise that corruption 
does not necessarily imply the existence of criminal activities. Activities such as 
acceptance of gratuities (though this is itself far from cut and dried) and 
‘kickbacks’ are not criminal but would often be considered unethical. Indeed, 
while corruption is generally thought of as actions involving the abuse of 
position, there is also a range of activities that are not illegal and do not 
necessarily involve either the exchange of money or other material goods. An 
example of this is the inappropriate disclosure of information or evidence which 
would, similarly, be regarded as unethical (HMIC, 2011). It is important to 
recognise therefore that conduct may be corrupt, even where the actions are not 
illegal and the ends being sought are – in organisational terms - legitimate ones 
(‘over-zealous policing with the aim of personal advancement’ (Newburn, 1999) 
for example). The problem with Kutnjak’s definition is that it focuses on personal 
rather than organisational gain. The latter, as the long history of police 
corruption amply illustrates, is a crucial in understanding such conduct.  
Kutnjak Ivkovic (2005) offers two defences for leaving out unethical conduct for 
organisational rather than personal gain from the definition of corruption. First, 
she suggests that because so-called ‘noble-cause corruption’ has different 
causes and involves different control efforts to other types of corrupt activity, it 
deserves to be thought of as a separate category. Second, she suggests that 
because corrupt actions for personal gain involve ‘something inherently more 
deviant and would probably be viewed as substantially more serious’ than 
corrupt acts for organisational benefit, again they should be treated separately. 
Both arguments are unconvincing. It is not clear that acts for organisational 
benefit are necessarily perceived to be the most serious breaches of trust by a 
police officer, nor is it the case that causes and control efforts in such cases are 
necessarily all that different. Indeed, in practice the overlap is very great. As a 
result, there are good reasons for considering Kleinig’s (1996:166) definition of 
corrupt conduct to be the most useful in this field. In his view: 
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‘Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their 
authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or 
departmental/divisional advantage.’ 
Though some will disagree with such an inclusive definition – one that inevitably 
encompasses quite a wide range of low-level, ethically-problematic conduct 
rather than more obviously serious misconduct – the argument is that such acts 
should be included as they are motivated by what the Wood Commission in 
Australia called ‘the spirit of corruption’ (Wood, 1997a); that is to say the primary 
intention behind such acts, like more serious forms of corrupt conduct, is the 
furtherance of private or organisational advantage.  
Although the bulk of literature – this review included – tends to begin with an 
attempt to offer some form of definition of corruption, the reality is that the 
primary function of such an activity is to offer the basis for analysis rather than a 
cut and dried method of distinguishing corrupt from non-corrupt conduct. The 
conclusion from the most telling analyses of police conduct is that the matter of 
police corruption is fundamentally one of ethics. That is to say, there will be 
some generally serious forms of conduct that it is easy to agree should be seen 
as ‘corrupt’. There are others, however, where much depends on the nature and 
circumstances of the conduct itself. The issue of ‘gratuities’ is often used to 
illustrate such arguments, in part because a free cup of coffee or a free meal 
would be unlikely to be considered by anyone (senior officer or member of the 
public alike) to be a serious breach of any code of conduct but, simultaneously, 
it is also recognised that the offer of such gratuities may contain the potential for 
inducing conduct which would be considered inappropriate. Some police 
departments, and some academics, take the view that the acceptance of any 
gifts ‘regardless of their value, should be regarded as police corruption’ (Kutnjak 
Ivkovic, 2005: 26-7). However, ‘the reality is that enforcement of such official 
rules is at the very least challenging – and may be unrealistic. At the same time, 
it is equally challenging to draw the line by determining a particular amount that 
would separate ethical from corrupt behaviour and to find an acceptable 
justification for that line’ (2005: 27). As a consequence, the answer to the 
question of whether the acceptance of small-scale gratuities is appropriate is in 
practice rarely a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ but is, rather, a matter for ethical assessment. 
The questions that then arise for police organisations concern whether their 
officers and staff are trained to make, and are capable of making, such ethical 
judgments. We return to issues of training and ethics later. The next issues to 
consider – again, very briefly – are the sources and causes of unethical/corrupt 
conduct.  
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‘Bad apples’ 
When corruption is uncovered there is a tendency within organisations, including 
the police service, to suggest or imply that the problem is one that is confined to 
a few rogue members or ‘bad apples’. This canard can be dealt with quickly. 
First, whilst it is perfectly possible, on occasion, for an individual, or a small 
number of individuals, to engage in highly unethical conduct, the history of 
policing has too many examples of institutionalised corruption for this 
‘explanation’ to carry much credence. Moreover, the notion of ‘bad apples’ has a 
number of far-reaching and potentially damaging implications. First, it narrows 
the scope of attention, often directing concern away from others – often those in 
positions of power and authority – whose conduct also ought to be subject to 
critical scrutiny. Second, it implies that, barring the individual ‘bad apples’, 
everything in the organisation is otherwise sound. This is rarely the case. Third, 
and linked to this earlier point, the very notion of ‘bad apples’ implies little is 
required other than the investigation and punishment of these individuals. 
Punishment, often severe, of a small number of individuals therefore becomes 
the default response to a corruption scandal.  
Such a response is flawed in at least two ways. It is informed by general 
deterrence theory, and assumes that such punishments will ‘send out a 
message’ to other officers about expected standards of conduct. This may have 
some substance but the evidence for any deterrent effect is not strong (Tonry, 
2008). Worse still, as suggested, such an approach fails to identify all those 
likely to be implicated in the ‘wrongdoing’ (often failing to hold supervisors or 
managers to account for example) and also fails to confront the structural 
problems or issues that tend to underpin the misconduct at the centre of the 
scandal. Indeed, there is little that could be more damaging to the health of the 
police service than recourse to a ‘bad apples’ explanation in response to 
corruption. As the American reformist Commissioner, Patrick V Murphy, once 
put it: “The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples 
– the organization, not just the individuals in it – because corrupt police are 
made, not born.” (quoted in Barker and Carter, 1986: 10). What, then, are the 
primary factors in police corruption? 
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‘Constant’ and ‘variable’ factors in corruption 
There are features of policing – central to its nature – that are always present 
and which mean that corruption is an ever-present possibility. There are also 
other ‘variable’ factors, which are present from time to time and which influence 
the likely extent of corruption. The constant factors are:  
 Discretion: the freedom to make decisions as to courses of action is 
central to professional policing 
 Low managerial visibility: much policing is done away from the view of 
supervisors 
 Low public visibility: much policing is done away from the view of the 
public 
 Peer group secrecy: police ‘culture’ is characterised by a high degree of 
internal solidarity and secrecy, and the so-called ‘blue wall of silence’ 
often protects wrongdoers 
 Managerial secrecy: managers often share the values and culture of 
those they manage 
 Association with lawbreakers/contact with temptation: police officers 
inevitably come into contact with a wide variety of people – from 
individual citizens to organised criminals - who have an interest in 
subverting ethical, professional policing.  
The main ‘variable’ factors are:  
 Community and political context: the extent to which corruption is 
tolerated more broadly  
 Organisational integrity and control: the extent to which the police 
organisation is appropriately led and managed  
 Opportunities for corruption: the extent and nature of contact with what 
is usually referred to as the ‘invitational edges’ of corruption (Manning 
and Redlinger, 1977): primarily ‘vice’ (the drug and sex industries in the 
main) and regulatory activities (construction, traffic and licensing etc.) 
 Governance: (externally) the extent to which, and the means by which, 
the police organisation is itself overseen and held to account, and 
(internally) the resources committed to, and emphasis placed on, integrity 
and corruption control.  
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 ‘Moral cynicism’: the extent to which officers develop a jaundiced view 
of the world  
The ‘Dirty Harry’ problem 
The list of ‘constant’ and ‘variable’ factors in police corruption illustrates two very 
simple but important points. The first is that the very nature of policing means 
that the potential for corruption is always present – there are many facets 
intrinsic to policing that make it vulnerable to various forms of misconduct. 
Second, and to reinforce the point made earlier, tackling corruption is by no 
means straightforward, with the range of factors involved needing to be matched 
by a wide range of preventive and investigative measures. Before moving on, it 
is important to return to the issue of so-called ‘noble-cause corruption’, or 
corruption for (primarily) organisational gain, for it remains a matter of particular 
importance within discussions of police corruption and integrity. ‘Noble-cause 
corruption’ concerns the extent to which it is reasonable to use ‘dirty’ means to 
achieve ‘noble’ ends. In the literature, debates around this question are often 
summarised as the ‘Dirty Harry’ problem. This is derived from the Clint 
Eastwood movie in which the protagonist, a San Francisco detective who, in his 
attempts to save a young woman who has been abducted, uses increasingly 
unconventional (unethical/illegal) means to do so. He fails, but what the movie, 
and novels by the likes of Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler and numerous 
other films and TV shows ask of us, is whether we side with ‘justice’ or with the 
‘dirty’ cop trying to save an innocent victim?  
The issue of ‘noble-cause corruption’ is important for a number of reasons. First, 
there is evidence that concerns about matters such as ‘perverting the course of 
justice’ rank high among members of the public (IPCC, 2011). Second, it 
appears that allegations about irregularities in relation to evidence and perjury 
are among the more frequent complaints from members of the public about 
police conduct (IPCC, 2011). Finally, there are suggestions that there are 
aspects of police culture, including the emphasis on performance targets, which 
increase the pressure, as one CID trainer put it to HMIC inspectors, on officers 
to ‘operate at the edge of the ethical envelope’ (HMIC, 1999).  
Is there a simple answer to the ‘Dirty Harry’ problem? Some would say ‘yes’, 
and that the answer is that ‘dirty’ means can never justify so-called ‘noble’ ends. 
In fact, there are few who would openly disagree. And yet it is clear from studies 
of policing in practice that some officers, and some in supervisory or managerial 
roles, occasionally tacitly endorse such conduct. That this is the case would 
come as no surprise to the late, distinguished scholar of police corruption, Carl 
Klockars. In his classic treatment of the subject, he suggested that this was 
another area of ethical complexity and that, in reality, it is a problem to which 
there is no easy resolution for the police service. It is not that he supported the 
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use of ‘dirty’ means; simply that he recognised not only that ‘Dirty Harry’ 
dilemmas are intrinsic to policing, but that there would inevitably be people both 
within the police service and outside it who would wish officers to have, as he 
puts it, the ‘moral courage and sensitivity’ occasionally to bend rules in order to 
achieve unquestionably good ends. This, to repeat, was not to defend such 
means – he suggests resorting to them inevitably ‘taints’ policing – but rather to 
recognise the inevitability of such dilemmas within policing. The strength of his 
argument is that it doesn’t resort to the simple formula of moral certainty – ‘good 
ends’ can never justify ‘dirty means’ – but, rather, accepts that officers are 
inevitably confronted with difficult decisions and that the resolution of such 
problems is itself complex. Nevertheless, the only way that we can ensure that 
dirty means will not be used too readily or too crudely is to punish those who 
use them and the agencies that endorse such means. Yet:  
‘In urging the punishment of policemen who resort to dirty means to 
achieve some unquestionably good and morally compelling end, we 
recognise that we create a Dirty Harry problem for ourselves and for 
those we urge to effect such punishments. It is a fitting end, one which 
teaches once again that the danger in Dirty Harry problems is never in 
their resolution, but in thinking that one has found a resolution with which 
one can truly live in peace.’ (Klockars, 1980: 47) 
In short, and rather like the question of ‘gratuities’, the answer is to engage 
officers in a dialogue that both accepts the complex moral world they are asked 
to inhabit, and recognises the difficult ethical decisions which they will almost 
certainly be asked to make.  
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2. A very brief history of British police 
corruption 
From the earliest days of the Bow Street Runners, through the formation of the 
New Police in the 1820s, to the phone hacking scandal of recent times, policing 
in the United Kingdom has been punctuated with examples of malpractice and 
misconduct. The range of corrupt activities uncovered has included the 
concealment of serious crimes, bribery, the fabrication and planting of evidence, 
the commission of serious crimes including allegations of murder. The Royal 
Commission on the Police, established by RA Butler in 1960 under the 
chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink, was prompted in part by a number of cases of 
alleged or actual misconduct and one in particular in Brighton in which there was 
evidence of corruption. In the event, two officers were convicted, though the 
chief constable, also accused of criminal conspiracy, was acquitted. The judge 
commented that despite the acquittal, the chief constable emerged with serious 
question marks against his character and professionalism. He was later 
dismissed by his Watch Committee though, on appeal, subsequently had his 
pension reinstated.  
Despite a glowing endorsement of British policing by the Royal Commission, 
allegations of corruption were to emerge shortly after its Final Report. As the 
Police Bill (subsequently to become the Police Act 1964) was passing through 
parliament, the local press, and subsequently national newspapers, began to 
print allegations concerning brutality by officers in Sheffield. The case led to the 
termination of the careers not just of the officers from the Crime Squad accused 
of assaulting witnesses, but also of senior officers. In a pattern that has 
subsequently become well-established in the corruption literature, the initial 
reaction within the force to the allegations was to attempt to cover them up, and 
in the highest echelons, to act to minimise the impact on the force. In a move 
prompted and supported by the Home Office, the chief constable and the senior 
investigating officer (a chief superintendent) were subsequently suspended from 
office pending an inquiry by the watch committee. A short time later, the chief 
constable resigned as did the detective chief superintendent – both, in effect, 
jumping before they were pushed. 
A second case, which also emerged in mid-1963 and involved allegations of 
police brutality, concerned a detective sergeant in the Metropolitan Police 
Service: Harold Challenor. The case came to light in the aftermath of a series of 
arrests that were made by Challenor and others at a protest demonstration 
during a royal state visit. Challenor, it was shown in court, had planted evidence 
on a number of suspects (the evidence being ‘half-bricks’), not only in this case 
but in a series of others. What was equally disturbing was the discovery, after 
examination, that Challenor was suffering from quite serious mental ill-health but 
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had been allowed to carry on in his duties. This was another case, not just of 
serious misconduct, but a failure of line management. Interestingly, given what 
was to surface in the Metropolitan Police Service later in the decade, one of the 
recommendations from an inquiry set up into the Challenor affair was that there 
should be greater integration of CID and the uniformed branch, together with 
much greater attention to record-keeping and evidence-handling.  
In the space of fewer than ten years, at least four separate corruption scandals 
involving Metropolitan Police officers were uncovered. It all began with 
journalists from The Times tape-recording conversations between detectives 
and criminals in which the covering-up of serious crimes was being discussed. 
Equally shocking to many was the apparent inability of those investigating the 
abuses to bring anyone to justice. Other scandals emerged, in particular 
concerning the Drug Squad and the Obscene Publications Squad (Cox et al, 
1977). There were even allegations toward the end of the 1970s that detectives 
had been involved in major armed robberies. Even the appointment of a 
reformist Commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, failed to break the cycle of scandal 
followed by failed investigation. The huge and heralded Operation Countryman, 
established by Mark’s successor, Sir David McNee, petered out in an unseemly 
exchange of allegations and counter-allegations of malpractice, incompetence 
and corruption.  
The criminal misconduct highlighted in the late 1960s and 1970s was closely 
followed by a series of miscarriages of justice, uncovered mainly in the 1980s, in 
which a range of abuses, including the suppression of evidence, the beating of 
suspects, and tampering with confessional evidence and perjury, were found to 
have occurred. An earlier case involving the murder of Maxwell Confait and 
subsequent overturning of the convictions of the two men initially convicted on 
the basis of their confessions, led more or less directly to the establishment of 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure and, subsequently, to the 
passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The cases uncovered 
during the 1980s – the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Carl Bridgewater 
affair, and the activities of the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad – involved 
activities often misleadingly referred to as ‘noble-cause corruption’ – described 
earlier as the use of illegitimate means to secure institutionally legitimate, or 
desired, ends.  
That corruption is, as the literature on the subject suggests, something which is 
an ever-present issue for the police service as illustrated by the range and 
plentiful nature of allegations that have arisen in the period since the major 
miscarriages of justice in the 1970s and 1980s. The cases, some (in)famous 
and others less so, include allegations of:  
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 cover-ups and corruption in relation to the Brinks Mat robbery; 
 possible impropriety in the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation; 
 inappropriate relationships with news organisations, including the sale of 
information and alleged undermining of investigations in the ‘phone-
hacking’ scandal; 
 misuse of the ‘supergrass’ system, including the manufacture of 
evidence; 
 deliberate promotion of misinformation in relation to the shooting of Jean 
Charles de Menezes; 
 possible impropriety linked to both the murder of the private investigator, 
Daniel Morgan, and in connection with the subsequent investigation; and 
 significant misconduct by undercover officers (as members of the Special 
Demonstration Squad), including criminal activity and perjury. 
There are a great many others and a growing body of literature, of various sorts, 
has emerged to document some of the more significant cases (see, for example, 
Gillard and Flynn, 2012; Hayes, 2013a and b; McLaughlin and Hall, 2007; Evans 
and Lewis, 2013; Davies, 2014). To reinforce the point, a 2011 report by the 
IPCC noted that approximately 10 percent of the annual referrals it receives 
concern allegations of corruption: 
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What are we to take from this? The answer is the simple and well-established 
fact from a vast body of literature that shows, despite suggestions that recent 
years have seen a decline in systemic corruption in UK policing (Transparency 
International, 2011), not only is it unlikely that corruption could ever be 
eliminated but any complacency about its existence or lack of realism about 
what it is necessary to prevent and control such conduct will quite quickly lead to 
the (re)-emergence of a serious problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Type of corruption referral to the IPPC 2008/9 to 2010/11 
 Perverting the course of justice: 
incl. falsification of records or 
witness statements, perjury, and 
tampering with evidence 
 Misuse of systems: incl. the 
unauthorised access of police 
systems for personal gain, 
including on behalf of friends or 
family 
 Unauthorised disclosure: incl. 
the disclosure of personal details 
of offenders, suspects or civilians; 
crime report information; or 
information that could jeopardise a 
court case 
 Abuse of authority: incl. the 
abuse of the trust or rights of a 
colleague or civilian and the 
misuse of police power and 
authority for organisational or 
personal gain 
 Theft/fraud: incl. theft while on 
duty; fraudulent expense or 
overtime claims; and unauthorised 
personal use of police credit 
cards. 
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3. The literature on corruption: its extent and 
value 
There is now a fairly extensive body of literature on the history and nature of 
police corruption as well as an expanding body of literature on efforts to tackle 
corruption and to protect and/or stimulate integrity. As mentioned earlier, there is 
now a growing body of work looking at aspects of police conduct in the UK, the 
bulk of it by investigative journalists and former police officers, much of which is 
uncovering – or at least making public – details about some of the more 
significant problems alleged to have affected, or be affecting British policing. 
Both domestically and internationally, and very understandably, much of the 
extant literature on corruption emanates from jurisdictions that have (a) 
considerable experience of police corruption, and (b) have initiated major 
inquiries and reform programmes in response to such experiences. The main 
reports from the major commissions are generally of great value in that, despite 
the fact that the majority are rather dated, they offer significant insight into the 
problem of corruption, the difficulties of uncovering corrupt conduct, the 
strategies most commonly adopted in response to the identified problems, and 
the often short-term impact of any changes that are instituted. The main reports 
worthy of significant scrutiny are those from: Knapp Commission (New York 
City) (Knapp, 1972); Mollen Commission (New York City) (Mollen, 1994); 
Fitzgerald Commission (Queensland) (Fitzgerald, 1989); Wood Commission 
(New South Wales) (Wood, JRT, 1997a and b). 
The last decade or so has seen an increasing number of studies, though they 
are still small in number, which attempt to measure the extent and nature of 
police corruption. The best known, and most rigorous, are those undertaken by 
the late Carl Klockars and colleagues (Klockars et al, 2000; Klockars et al, 2005; 
Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2003). Such work is, by its very nature, subject to some very 
considerable limitations, not least because of the ‘invisibility’ of much of the 
conduct itself, and the well-documented unwillingness of officers to reveal 
information about such conduct (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland, 2005). The bulk 
of the literature, about police corruption specifically, or corrupt activity more 
generally, has increasingly sought to identify ‘indicators’ of corruption (see, in 
particular, Transparency International, 2012; 2013). 
Finally, there is now a substantial and impressive body of work on trust and 
confidence in policing (see, in particular, Hough et al, 2010; Jackson et al, 
2012a; Jackson et al, 2012b) which, in particular, takes Tom Tyler’s research on 
‘procedural justice’ and applies it to policing. Such work, reflecting elements of 
Tyler’s earlier studies (e.g., Tyler, 2006), strongly suggests that the greater the 
extent to which citizens feel their interactions with police officers are 
characterised by procedural fairness, the greater the likelihood they are both to 
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want to, and actually will, comply. The implications in the field on corruption and 
misconduct are potentially profound. Most obviously, such work underlines the 
potentially hugely deleterious consequences of police actions that are perceived 
to be illegitimate or unfair and reinforces, were it necessary, one of the key 
reasons why corrupt conduct is such an important matter. In addition, however, 
it also points to the fact that police departments seeking to deal with corruption, 
and to enhance integrity, also need to be seen to operate fairly and legitimately 
with members of those organisations. 
  
  17 
4. Approaches to tackling corruption and 
enhancing integrity 
There is now a significant body of evidence from a variety of jurisdictions about 
anti-corruption efforts. In the main, the lessons from this evidence have changed 
little in the last decade or so (for an earlier comprehensive review see Newburn, 
1999). Some of the central lessons now have more supporting evidence, and 
there is material from a broader range of countries than was available a decade 
and a half ago. Nevertheless, the central messages remain largely unchanged. 
These, in short order, are that:  
 although there are many barriers to successful corruption control, there is 
evidence that police agencies can be reformed;  
 reform needs to go beyond the immediately identified problem;  
 reform must look at the political and task environments as well as the 
organisation itself;  
 reform tends not to be durable; and  
  continued vigilance and scepticism are vital.  
At the heart of much contemporary corruption control there is the matter of 
police integrity, and the related issues of how this might be simulated and 
protected. Police integrity is best thought of as ‘the normative inclination among 
police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation’ 
(Klockars et al, 2006: 1). This definition of integrity used by Klockars and 
colleagues has five components: 
 It is normative: that is to say it concerns beliefs, not just conduct; it is 
morally charged in that it is explicitly about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; and, it 
combines a belief with an accordance to behave in line with that belief. 
 It involves an inclination to resist: it acknowledges that it is only one 
source of resistance to misconduct, but it is likely to exert some pressure. 
 It focuses on ‘police’ rather than ‘police officer’ or ‘officer’ because it is not 
reducible to the characteristics of individuals but, rather, can also be a 
characteristic of groups and organisations. 
 By focusing on temptation it draws attention to the different 
environments in which police operate and makes these crucial to 
understanding conduct. 
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 At its core lies the notion of abuse, recognising that corruption is not 
innocent or defensible and cannot have ‘noble’ causes.  
The promotion and reinforcement of integrity has become something of a staple 
in police organisations concerned with problems of corruption and misconduct. 
Indeed, commenting on perceived improvements in British policing, 
Transparency International (2011: 19) had the following to say: 
‘All the evidence points to a reduction in systemic corruption in the UK 
police force (sic). This has undoubtedly been aided by the much stronger 
integrity mechanisms put in place in recent years. Each force makes 
continual checks on corrupt activities, information-sharing is transparent 
(in terms of lines of accountability) and also well-co-ordinated.’ 
Writing at the same time, however, HMIC (2011) argued that many forces simply 
did not have the issue of integrity on their radar and went on to note that few 
organisations had resolved the issue of how to promote integrity successfully. 
As a means of both measuring and then exploring how police integrity might be 
enhanced American researchers used scenarios as the basis for examining 
officers’ views as well as organisational approaches to the issue. Klockars et al 
(2006) asked 3,235 officers questions about hypothetical scenarios that tested a 
series of questions, notably: 
 Do officers know the rules?1 
 How strongly do they support the rules? 
 Do they know what disciplinary threat this agency makes for violation of 
those rules? 
 Do they think the discipline is fair? 
Officers were given 11 scenarios.2 In their answers they indicated that they saw 
some violations as being much more serious than others. Four of the eleven 
cases were not considered very serious at all. These were scenarios involving 
the off-duty operation of a security system business, receipt of free meals, 
receipt of holiday gifts, and cover up of a police accident involving driving under 
the influence of alcohol. There were a further four scenarios involving behaviour 
that was considered moderately serious. These involved the use of excessive 
                                            
1
 Their first question should have been are the rules clear? The (2011) HMIC report suggests 
that lack of clarity around some of the ethical issues is not uncommon and, logically, this 
requires clarification prior to officers being asked if they understand them.  
2
 This work is now considered to have strong validity having been have been administered to 
more than 30,000 officers in 30 police agencies, and having been correlated with observers’ 
ratings of agency integrity. 
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force on a car thief following a foot pursuit, a supervisor offering an officer time 
off during holiday in exchange for working on his personal car, acceptance of 
free drinks in exchange for ignoring a late bar closing, and receipt of a 
‘kickback’. Finally, there were three cases that were viewed as being very 
serious. They were stealing from a found wallet, accepting a financial bribe, and 
stealing a watch at a crime scene3 (Klockars et al, 2000).  
Their conclusion was that integrity could be fostered in (at least) the following 
ways: 
 treating integrity as something that is central to, and driven by, the 
organisation’s culture; 
 rules governing misconduct should be specified and officers trained in 
their application; 
 the ways in which police managers detect, investigate, and discipline 
misconduct shows officers how serious they consider misconduct to be; 
and 
 administrators should expressly require all officers to report misconduct.  
This approach – one that seeks to combine clarity about rules and strong 
enforcement with a variety of approaches to fostering integrity – emerges from a 
sizeable criminological literature which points to the limitations of punitive 
approaches to crime control (for a review, see Nagin, 2013). Clarity around 
social and legal norms, and an ability to respond quickly and effectively to 
transgressions are an important element of any crime control system. However, 
like public health messages, in many ways the key is prevention.  
Consequently, while it is important that forces investigate and punish 
misconduct, and are seen to do so, it is equally (if not more) important that they 
engage proactively in the stimulation and maintenance of an organisational 
culture which has integrity at its core. That is to say, and following the definition 
of integrity used earlier, the assumption must be that the processes through 
which integrity is maintained and enhanced in police organisations are different 
from strategies that pertain to individuals (Klockars et al, 2006).  
To this can be added the observation that strategies should address all types of 
staff – civilian staff and officers at all levels. They should focus on work as well 
as non-work factors, and should involve arrangements for ongoing monitoring of 
the ‘ethical health’ of the organisation (Miller, 2003).  
                                            
3
 It should be noted that all but one of these scenarios concerns misconduct motivated by 
personal gain, the exception being the use of excessive force. It only measures one aspect of 
integrity, therefore. Nevertheless, the issues it raises are undoubtedly more generally applicable.  
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In what follows, and focusing both on corruption control and building integrity, 
strategies are divided into internal and external reform efforts (as is the case in 
most of the literature). The two, predictably, are linked but it is helpful, 
analytically, to think of them separately. Generally speaking, depending on the 
categories used, the literature identifies upwards of 15 core procedures or 
strategies used by police departments in tackling corruption and promoting 
integrity. Table 4.1 lists the primary internal and external control approaches 
identified by the literature.  
Table 4.1 Strategies for tackling corruption and maintaining integrity in police agencies 
Internal/external  Strategies Detail 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primarily 
internal 
1. Institutional reform Covering a range of reforms 
(highlighted below) and often 
involving a flattening of 
hierarchies 
2. Detection and 
investigation 
May be reactive (from 
intelligence or complaints) or 
proactive (from examination of 
records to integrity testing  
3. Discipline and 
punishment of corrupt 
officers 
From administrative discipline 
through to prosecution. 
Intention is both to punish and 
to deter 
4. Encourage reporting of 
misconduct/’whistleblowing’ 
Make every effort to break the 
‘blue wall of silence’; provide 
genuine support for 
‘whistleblowers’ 
5. Monitor propensity for 
corruption 
Increasingly organisations are 
monitoring ‘risks’, from the 
time of recruitment/selection, 
throughout officers’ careers 
6. Enhance recruitment & 
selection procedures 
Significant reform of the 
recruitment/selection process, 
with particular emphasis on 
integrity 
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7. Enhance training of 
officers 
In particular around ethics and 
integrity. Do officers 
understand the rules and 
expectations? 
8. Set official policies and 
enforce them 
Wherever possible, clarity 
about expectations of officers 
is crucial. Not only must it be 
clear, but such standards 
must be enforced if they are to 
be taken seriously 
9. Establish robust internal 
supervision and 
accountability 
A multitude of studies from a 
range of countries show 
failure of oversight to be a 
crucial element in problems of 
corruption 
10. Provide resources for 
control 
There is little point in forces 
talking seriously about 
corruption control unless they 
have sufficient resources to 
deal with the issue 
11. Limit opportunities for 
corruption 
Manage and monitor those 
areas of work where the risks 
of corruption are greatest 
12. Cultivate culture 
intolerant of corruption 
Clear leadership at all levels 
promoting ethical conduct and 
encouraging the reporting of 
misconduct 
 
Primarily 
external 
13. Establish robust 
external supervision and 
accountability 
Ensuring effective democratic 
oversight and control of local 
policing, including oversight of 
control efforts 
14. Detect and investigate 
corruption not investigated 
by the police agency 
Support and where possible 
enhance the ability of external 
scrutiny bodies to examine 
allegations of misconduct and 
corruption 
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 15. Disseminate information 
about corruption and its 
control 
Collect and disseminate 
robust information about 
levels and types of 
misconduct and responses to 
such behaviour 
Source: Adapted from Kutjnac Ivkovic, 2005; Prenzler; 2009; Transparency International, 
2012 
1. Institutional reform 
One response to corruption scandals has involved major institutional 
restructuring or reform. In Belgium, in the aftermath of the Dutroux scandal, the 
official inquiry was highly critical of the segmentation of forces, and the rivalry 
between them, and recommended the creation of a single, national force 
(Punch, 2003). In Australia, Commissions of Inquiry appointed in the aftermath 
of major scandals in Queensland and New South Wales adopted much of then 
popular new managerialist theory in proposing sweeping changes to the 
respective police departments. Some of these proposals – particularly where 
they concern issues of management, recruitment and accountability – are dealt 
with below. However, on occasion, structural changes were also proposed, in 
particular focusing on the flattening of police organisational hierarchies 
(Fitzgerald, 1989) or as the Wood Commission (1997a) put it, ‘the absolute 
concentration on frontline policing in local area commands under a flatter 
management structure’ (quoted in Fleming and Lafferty, 2000: 162). Though 
proving any direct link, the Queensland and New South Wales forces claim that 
such changes contributed to the reduction in corruption problems in both 
jurisdictions.  
2. Investigation and detection 
Whatever the seriousness of the misconduct under consideration, there is 
general agreement in the literature that police agencies should commit 
significant resources to the investigation and detection of ‘corruption’. 
Unfortunately, the literature on police corruption is full of sorry tales of the failure 
of police forces properly to investigate allegations of, or intelligence concerning, 
corrupt practices (see, for example, McAlary, 1994) and it is vital that sufficient 
resources are committed to such activity (see below). In terms of investigation 
and the collection of intelligence, such activity can be what Sherman (1978) 
describes as ‘premonitory’ or ‘postmonitory’: that is, collected before/during or 
after the corrupt act. One of the first questions, therefore, is from where 
information/intelligence about such activities can be drawn? There are three 
primary sources: citizens; police officers themselves; and, proactive probing of 
police activities. 
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Citizens 
Although corrupt police activity (like much police activity) is ‘hidden’, some 
intelligence will inevitably come from the public. The bigger question is how 
prepared and how well organised are police agencies to collect and respond to 
such intelligence? A number of issues arise here. How can police agencies 
ensure that complaints of corruption are properly and fully recorded? Second, 
how should police agencies treat anonymous reports of corruption and 
malpractice? 
Police officers 
The best source of intelligence is that from police officers: both ‘honest’ and 
‘corrupt’ officers, though it is the latter who are of greatest use to investigators. 
Two assumptions about policing and corruption have made agencies shy away 
from attempting to use corrupt officers as a source of proactive intelligence 
gathering. The first is the continued dominance of the few ‘bad apples’ ideology, 
something which acts against long-term and sustained action against corruption. 
The second is that police agencies are often thought to be overridingly loyal and 
monolithic – the code of silence is too strong to allow officers to ‘betray’ their 
colleagues. That said, much effort in recent times has gone into trying to tackle 
the ‘blue wall of silence’ and we return to this subject below when we consider 
‘whistleblowing’.  
It is more usual to rely upon officers believed to be untainted by allegations of 
corruption, and many of the more famous corruption inquiries – the Mollen and 
Knapp Commissions in particular - used the support of honest officers in the 
battle against corruption. In particular, under Commissioner Murphy the NYPD 
used its ‘field associates’ programme to recruit large numbers of officers to the 
cause of reporting on corrupt colleagues (McCormack and Ward, 1987).  
Integrity testing and covert investigation 
Much of the available evidence suggests that proactive investigatory methods 
are at least as successful as postmonitory approaches, if not more effective. 
Nevertheless, there appears to continue to be some reluctance among police 
departments to use such methods. The proactive detection of corruption by 
internal police units tends, understandably, to be more common in police 
agencies that have, or are concerned about, problems of corrupt practice. 
Internal affairs units are established in order to provide a secure internal 
investigative capability, as well as offering ‘an excuse for being honest’ 
(McCormack, 1987:155). The most common methods used in such proactive 
investigation are: informants; wiretaps; ‘corruption patrols’ (focused primarily on 
locations known for gambling, prostitution, drugs sales and illegal drinking would 
be observed for signs of ‘payoffs’); and, integrity testing.  
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Integrity testing represents one of the more controversial tactics in corruption 
control but is an approach that has been increasingly used in recent times. In 
the UK the idea of integrity testing has been adapted as one of the proposed 
responses to the problem of racism (Macpherson, 1999), though such 
approaches – effectively changing the central question being asked from ‘is he 
corrupt?’ to ‘is he corruptible?’ (Marx, 1992) – raise a host of ethical questions, 
not least in relation to the danger of entrapment. Integrity tests can be 
administered both randomly (across the workforce) and selectively (on those 
where there is some intelligence or suspicion).  
Despite the difficulties and the ethical dilemmas raised, integrity testing has 
become a central plank of corruption control within police departments that have 
experienced particular problems (both the NYPD and the Metropolitan Police 
have had periods at least where they have invested quite heavily in integrity 
testing). There are suggestions that it has been found to be an effective tool, 
though as yet there seems little published information that would allow such a 
claim to be fully assessed.  
A report by KPMG in 1996 for the New York Police Department concluded that 
while random integrity testing was a potentially useful tactic, its success to that 
point did not justify its continuation, whereas targeted testing appeared to have 
had a far higher success rate (Prenzler and Ronken, 2001). Nevertheless, 
Transparency International (2000: 192) has claimed that:  
‘There can also be no question that integrity testing is a tremendous 
deterrent to corrupt activity. The NYPD has seen a dramatic rise in the 
number of reports by police officers themselves of bribe offers and other 
corrupt conduct by members of the public and/or other officers since the 
integrity-testing programme was initiated. Some of this rise is 
undoubtedly attributable to the fact that NYPD police officers are 
concerned that their actions may be subject to monitoring and that even 
the failure to report a corrupt incident could subject them to disciplinary 
action.’ 
A variety of other ‘undercover’ techniques are used in corruption investigation, 
including surveillance; turn-arounds; body-microphones; and wiretaps. Covert 
surveillance became quite a common tactic in the NYPD and New South Wales 
Police after the Knapp and Wood Commissions respectively, with the latter 
suggesting that telecommunications interception was ‘an essential and cost-
effective strategy’ against corruption (Prenzler, 2009: 143). Undercover 
operations in the field of corruption control, however, bring with them a number 
of risks – essentially the same risks that attach to any form of undercover police 
activity. Gary Marx points to a number of ethical and practical issues raised by 
proactive and undercover investigation of corruption:  
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 the potential stimulation of crime that would not otherwise have occurred;  
 the redirection of resources away from crimes ‘known’ to the police 
towards ‘possible offences’;  
 the potential involvement of police officers in criminal activity; 
 inappropriate behaviour on the part of the state;  
 the protection of criminals, and the non-prosecution of offences 
committed by those criminals, because of their ‘usefulness’;  
 the potential violation of officers’ rights;  
 negative impact (though possibly short-term) on public attitudes toward 
the police; and  
 negative impact on officer morale (Marx, 1992; Punch 1994). 
Such ethical concerns, together with the financial costs and the mixed results 
that random testing has so far produced, have led to considerable restriction in 
the use of integrity testing within the police service, both in the UK and beyond.  
Nonetheless, Prenzler and Ronken (2001) suggest a number of areas in which 
‘integrity testing’ or, perhaps more accurately, ‘behavioural audits’ might 
reasonably be used, in particular in ensuring procedural compliance, including: 
 how police respond to enquiries and crime reports from the public (HMIC, 
1999);  
 how internal affairs officers respond to complaints (Henry, 1990); 
 how police conduct random breath tests and respond to attempted 
evasions by off-duty police (Homel, 1997); 
 how police respond to approaches from ethnic minorities (Marx, 1992); 
and 
 how police manage domestic disturbances and advise victims of 
domestic violence. 
While intelligence from wiretaps, direct observation by ‘corruption patrol officers’, 
and integrity tests have all proved important in anti-corruption activities, existing 
evidence suggests that verbal testimony remains the most common source of 
information. Despite the predominance of standard policing techniques, and 
understandable concerns about the use of more proactive or ethically 
challenging methods of investigation, Prenzler and Ronken (2001: 339) 
conclude that: ‘the frequent exposure of police to opportunities for corruption 
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and misconduct suggests that more pre-emptive strategies will be required to 
maximize ethical standards’. Thus, whilst the evidence for the extended use of 
random testing is currently quite weak, they suggest that this is a field in which, 
at the very least, further experimentation and assessment should undoubtedly 
occur.  
3. Discipline and punishment of corrupt officers 
As Prenzler (2009: 79) puts it, a ‘robust and fair complaints and discipline 
system is essential to control misconduct, encourage public confidence in police 
integrity, and ensure the loyalty and confidence of honest police’. Given that the 
bulk of intelligence about misconduct derives from complaints it is vital that that 
system is easy to access, is appropriately responsive and itself transparent and 
accountable. By appropriately responsive, it is meant that the system should 
strike a balance between being seen to take allegations seriously whilst leading 
to responses that are proportionate to the nature of the misconduct being 
alleged. Picking up on this balancing act, Prenzler suggests that this tends to 
lead to a number of potential options, including: 
1. A retrospectively oriented system that is procedurally fair and methodical, 
oriented toward finding the truth, and applying a just response. 
2. A future-oriented system focused on behavioural improvements, primarily 
through efficient processing of complaints and dispositions centred on 
retraining or close supervision. 
3. Future-oriented ‘restorative’ responses, centred on reconciling conflicts 
either through mediation between parties or efficient localised forms of 
communication, explanation and apology. 
The standard approach within police departments in recent times has been 
organised around a Professional Standards Unit (or similar), responsible for the 
investigation of complaints. Such units differ from traditional ‘reactive’ 
complaints departments in that they ‘proactively cultivate and analyse 
information or ’intelligence’ on unethical police activity from a range of sources, 
and mount formal investigations into suspects thereby identified’ (Miller, 2003: 
2). PSUs are generally divided into an intelligence cell, and one or more 
operational team and Miller illustrates their general organisation in the following 
way:  
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Prenzler’s (2009: 96) conclusion from his review of the experience of complaints 
and discipline systems is that the system should be ‘inquisitorial, focused on 
finding the truth and achieving the best resolution of a matter, and removing 
officers who commit repeat breaches or serious offences. Punitive responses 
need to be balanced against remedial and restorative responses. Independent 
quality measures are essential to prevent backsliding into weak, biased, and 
ineffective processes’. How, then, are PSUs generally fairing?  
Miller’s research, though conducted over a decade ago4, still contains some 
important lessons for PSUs. In summary, Miller found that there remained both 
an absence of accurate information about, and considerable suspicion of, PSUs 
and that ‘marketing’ of their work within forces was important both as an aid to 
deterrence and to encourage co-operation. There remained issues relating to 
recruitment of staff, both in terms of attracting the best investigators to such 
work, and reintegrating them when they returned to other duties. Further, he 
suggested that more needed to be done to ensure that lessons learned within 
PSUs were agreed and implemented within forces. Finally, increased resources 
for professional standards, at both a regional and national level, would help 
complement and increase the capacity of force-level units. Finally in this regard, 
Miller goes on to outline a series of considerations, summarised in the following 
table, which impinge on decision-making around the investigation of corruption. 
                                            
4
 It is hard to escape the conclusion that further research in the field of police integrity and 
corruption ought to be a priority for the Home Office. 
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The lengthy literature and history of police corruption is replete with 
references to, and accounts of, the impact of the so-called ‘blue code/wall of 
silence’ (Skolnick, 2002). In essence, a product of the solidarity and loyalty 
intrinsic to police culture, the code has been found by almost every serious 
commission of inquiry into police corruption. The Wood Commission in New 
South Wales (Wood, 1997a) suggested that the code of silence contributed to 
corruption in at least four main ways:  
 for honest and inexperienced officers it influenced them to accept 
corruption as part of the job;  
 for managers it engendered a sense of futility that corruption could be 
challenged or the police service reformed;  
 for corrupt officers it was a means by which they could manipulate and 
control fellow officers; and  
 for internal investigators it discouraged vigorous inquiry.  
Central, therefore, to any successful set of strategies to investigate, detect 
and prevent police corruption are systems that encourage the reporting of 
misconduct or what might these days be referred to as ‘whistleblowing’.  
4. Encourage reporting of misconduct/ 
'whistleblowing’ 
Unfortunately, there is very little research on the subject of police 
whistleblowing. An analysis of activity in the aftermath of the Fitzgerald 
Commission in Queensland found some indication that there was an 
increased willingness among officers to report misconduct, and this was 
linked to the greater likelihood of punishment where unreported misconduct 
was revealed (Brereton and Ede, 1996). Prenzler (2009: 85) concludes rather 
pessimistically that ‘compulsory whistle-blower legislation is one of those 
things that is necessary in principle, but its effects on behaviour are unclear or 
likely to be weak’ (see also, Johnson, 2005). At the very least Kutnjak Ivkovic 
(2005) argues, police agencies ought to reward the reporting of misconduct 
and guarantee anonymity to whistleblowers. Unfortunately, despite the 
development of considerably improved policies toward whistleblowing, it 
appears that their treatment with British public services still falls far short of 
what is required if misconduct is successfully to be tackled.5 
                                            
5
 www.theguardian.com/society/2014/aug/01/public-service-whistleblowers-treated-
shockingly?CMP=twt_gu (accessed 12.8.14) 
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5. Monitor propensity for corruption 
Corruption is an ever-present risk within police organisations and there is 
clear evidence that a failure to monitor risks is a crucial factor in the (re)-
emergence of corruption scandals. Part of the danger lies in the assumption 
that the propensity for corruption is static and that rigorous recruitment and 
selection processes would mitigate the problem. Indeed, as we will come to 
shortly, recruitment and selection processes are a potentially important plank 
in corruption control systems and it remains important for police departments 
to be alive continuously to the risks and pressures that might conduce toward 
misconduct. There are an increasing number of tools available to police 
departments designed to aid the measurement of integrity (see, for example, 
Klockars et al, 2005) which, though imperfect, are claimed to ‘have proven 
reliable and capable of measuring differences and changes in the 
organisational environments in which they have been employed’ (2005: 253).  
6. Enhance recruitment and selection procedures 
One regular response by police forces that have experienced significant 
problems of corruption has been substantial reform of a whole range of 
existing recruitment and selection practices, and implementation of new 
procedures. A 1997 Commission on Police Integrity studying corruption in 
Chicago (the largest US police department outside New York City) 
recommended higher standards in relation to recruitment and screening 
(Commission on Police Integrity, 1997) and similar proposals can be found in 
the majority of the reports of the major Commissions of Inquiry into corruption. 
Such inquiries have tended to identify a number of problems with recruitment 
and selection. These include: 
 overwork/under-staffing of recruitment departments; 
 questionable competence/integrity of staff involved in recruitment;  
 inadequate standards in recruitment (or failure to implement accepted 
standards) (LAPD, 2000); and 
 insufficient background checking/investigation of potential recruits 
(Mollen, 1994; LAPD, 2000). 
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Prenzler (2009) lists the main elements of progressive recruitment for integrity 
as being the following: 
 criminal history checks and automatic exclusion for disqualifying 
offences; 
 character references, especially from employers; 
 psychological tests that flag possible negative character traits; 
 drug tests; and 
 panel interviews that probe applicants’ ethical awareness and personal 
principles, and follow-up investigations of possible adverse indicators. 
In addition, he lists the following potential additions (all used in some police 
departments): 
 Polygraph testing (Cochrane et al, 2003) 
 Home visits (PEAC, 1998) 
 Intelligence checks on associates (Ferguson, 2003) 
 Higher recruitment age (Mollen, 1994) 
 Personal financial checking (PEAC, 1998) 
 Higher educational standards (Wood, 1997a). 
As Klockars et al (2005) argue, the resources that an organisation allocates to 
such activities are indicative of the extent to which they take such matters 
seriously. Accepting that there will always be significant resource constraints, 
they argue that the bottom line in corruption control is the establishment of a 
set of clearly defined standards in relation to recruitment and the 
operationalisation of these standards with the utmost seriousness. The focus 
on recruitment, however, is only the first stage of a continuous process that 
involves training, both of new recruits and established employees.  
7. Enhance training of officers 
McCormack (1996), among many others, has suggested that it is quite 
possible to effect behavioural change within organisations as a result of the 
imposition of strong internal controls which heighten the risk of detection. 
However, this is far from sufficient and he argues that ‘long-term change 
depends more upon internalizing new ethical standards’ than it does on a 
more generally punitive response to misconduct (McCormack, 1996: 245). 
Both, it appears, are required.  
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Reforming training of recruits is perhaps the most common response among 
police agencies attempting to deal with corruption. Goldstein, writing in the 
1970s, (Goldstein, 1975) noted that most police training avoided discussion of 
corruption, and work in the following two decades noted that little appears to 
have changed (Wood, 1997a; Mollen Commission, 1994). Critical scholarship 
at the time suggested that even on those occasions when discussion of 
corruption and ethics did form part of training, it was often done in a manner 
that was unlikely to resonate with new recruits or make much difference to 
subsequent behaviour (Goldstein, 1975). 
Since the mid-1990s this has arguably begun to change – though there 
remains a long way to go. In the aftermath of the corruption scandal of the 
1990s, the New York Police Department put particular emphasis on its new 
anti-corruption strategy, and this placed a heavy emphasis on ethics and 
values training for officers, especially those in supervisory positions (Giuliani 
and Bratton, 1995). The Wood Commission in New South Wales 
recommended that the teaching of ethics and integrity should be practically 
integrated in every aspect of police education and training in New South 
Wales, from recruitment, through continuing education to management 
training (1997a: 542). 
In the UK, a series of reports has focused very significantly on training. 
HMIC’s (2011) report recommended that: ‘Training courses should include 
appropriate input in relation to integrity and anti-corruption. In particular, given 
the importance of leadership to securing high standards of integrity… the 
Strategic Command Course and the High Potential Development Scheme 
should encompass these issues.’ Nevertheless, and illustrating the difficulties 
encountered in other jurisdictions, the 2012 follow-up report noted that 
education on integrity issues within forces was ‘patchy’ and was generally 
limited to generic training with, for example, only six forces at that stage 
providing ‘well-structured training in relation to gifts and hospitality’. HMIC 
similarly found training within police authorities to be limited, and often limited 
to high-level statements rather than detailed policy and procedure. This 
should all be set against a background of research evidence – albeit still 
somewhat limited – which suggests that detailed, ongoing in-service training 
in relation to issues of integrity is vital in corruption control (Klockars et al, 
2005; Graycar and Prenzler, 2013). 
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8. Set official policies and enforce them 
The bulk of policing literature – both academic and professional – now 
recognises the central importance of a clear code of ethics to police 
performance. In part, the globalisation of policing has stimulated the 
development of standard setting, giving rise to a variety of protocols including 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the Council of Europe’s Declaration 
on the Police and the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics.  
As with any change within organisations, it is policies that are changed first 
(and then, one hopes, that practices change in line with policies). The area of 
corruption control is no different and forces that have struggled with corrupt 
practices have sought to develop policies that would codify the standards of 
behaviour expected of staff and outline the general parameters of the 
organisation’s response to the problem. An aspect of what Punch (1994) calls 
a model of ‘positive social control’ for police organisations is the role of what 
he refers to as ‘codes and compliance’. In addition to formal rules and 
regulations, he argues that police forces should construct and adopt an ethical 
code that ‘spells out a wider concern with integrity and ethical behaviour in 
police work’ (1994: 34-5). Equal consideration needs to be given to the means 
by which officers will be encouraged or persuaded to comply with the 
standards set out in the code and we come to this below.  
Finally, it is sometimes suggested that the adoption of codes will result in the 
unhelpful fettering of police discretion and, consequently, a diminution in 
police effectiveness (this links to the earlier discussion of ‘Dirty Harry’ 
problems). This, however, is not the logic of such codes. An elaborate 
structure of rules is inevitable, given the nature of policing. Such rules do not 
aim to suppress discretion, but simply to improve its exercise. At heart, as 
outlined earlier lies the issue of ethics, and there are well-established reasons 
for believing that an emphasis on ethics and integrity is important to tackling 
corruption in police departments (see Kleinig, 1996; Palmer 1992): 
 ethics contribute to the image of law enforcement as a profession;  
 a code of ethics helps to engender self-respect among individual 
officers;  
 a code of ethics may contribute to mutual respect among officers and 
to the development of a positive esprit de corps; and  
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 a code of ethics provides guidance as to how the law should be 
enforced. There is, in this regard, a straightforward link between 
training, competence and malpractice/corruption. It means that the 
better officers are at using legitimate means, the less they will need to 
have recourse to illegitimate ones.  
9. Establish robust internal supervision and 
accountability 
Central to all accounts of successful corruption control is the existence and 
maintenance of robust systems for holding officers and staff – at all levels – to 
account. All the major Commissions of Inquiry into police corruption have 
highlighted failures of supervision and management and it has become 
standard practice to increase or tighten supervision in the aftermath of a 
corruption scandal. Indeed, one of the implications of the rejection of the ‘bad 
apple theory’ is that, in order to proliferate, corrupt practices need, at the very 
least, the implicit support of officers in supervisory and managerial positions. 
One of the key aspects in any strategy designed to tackle corruption is 
inculcating a sense of ‘responsibility’ for police integrity among staff in those 
positions. Punch (1994) refers to ‘positive symbolic leadership’. By this he 
means a form of leadership in which senior officers state explicitly and openly 
that: 
 the ends never justify the means;  
 they are running a ‘clean’ organisation even if this weakens their 
ostensible effectiveness;  
 they will be as open as possible about internal deviance and will co-
operate fully with external agencies; and  
 they will personally serve as role models for integrity (Punch, 1994: 
34). 
The key point of ‘positive leadership’, he argues, is that it sends an 
unambivalent message to the rest of the organisation and to those outside the 
organisation. To this end, one recent review of policing and police leadership 
(Neyroud, 2011) called for the development of a police professional body with 
the aim that the service in the future should be: driven by public interest and 
outwardly focused; should evince a firm commitment to ethical leadership, 
human rights and equality; and should be responsible for professional 
standards for public service in policing.  
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Arguably the key issue for police agencies is how to ensure that those in 
supervisory and managerial positions take responsibility for tackling 
corruption. One method is to seek to diffuse responsibility for control of 
misconduct both vertically and horizontally within the organisation, for 
example by employing something akin to the idea of vicarious liability. The 
intention (vertically) is that managers should, in some way, be held 
responsible for the behaviour of their staff. This, the Mollen Commission in 
New York described as ‘reinventing the enforcement of command 
accountability’ (Mollen, 1994: 5). Simultaneously, the aim (horizontally) is also 
that peers should have an individual and collective responsibility for probity 
within the ranks.  
10. Provide resources for control  
In relation to recruitment and selection, earlier we noted that the resources 
committed to these tended to reflect the seriousness with which organisations 
take such endeavours. That particular point can be extended to the whole of 
corruption control more generally. There is substantial evidence that the cycle 
of scandal and reform that has been noted in so many jurisdictions is a 
cyclical one and that this, at least in part, reflects the rise and fall in the 
seriousness with which leaders take the issue of corruption and, 
consequently, the extent of the resources they decide to commit to such 
activities (Sherman, 1986). As the Mollen Commission put it in relation to the 
New York Police Department in the mid-1990s: 
‘From the top brass down, there was an often debilitating fear about 
police corruption disclosures because it was perceived as an 
embarrassment to the Department, and likely to engender a loss of 
public confidence… This attitude infected the entire Department, 
manifesting itself in different ways throughout the ranks. It encouraged 
the Department’s top managers to allow corruption controls to wither 
through neglect and denial of resources, and to allow the principle of 
command accountability to collapse through lack of enforcement (1994: 
70-71).’ 
11. Limit opportunities for corruption 
There are areas of policing that, historically, have been found to be more 
prone to corruption than ‘routine’ police work. Many of these are predictable 
and include vice, drugs, undercover policing, informant-handling and, to a 
lesser extent, responsibility for placing contracts – all of which appear to be 
areas of vulnerability (Goldstein, 1975; Punch, 2000). Furthermore, there are 
also procedures that may inadvertently encourage corruption, including 
unrealistic productivity targets; inadequate means for paying informants; and, 
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insufficient funds for buying drugs from ‘dealers’. One standard technique for 
reducing the likelihood of corruption therefore is to limit opportunities either by 
changing approaches to particular tasks or by introducing new procedures for 
managing and governing such work. Punch (2000) suggests three general 
lessons in this regard: 
1. Specialised units – such units often work well, particularly well, and 
subsequently it is found that their activities have been unduly ‘creative’. 
The lesson from a variety of jurisdictions, Punch says, is you have ‘to 
distrust your best performers and high achievers’. Managers like to see 
positive results, but they also have continually ask how were such 
results achieved? 
2. Senior officers – while there is a tendency to focus on those on the 
front line, senior officers have significant power and discretion, often 
placing them in vulnerable positions: ‘No-one is immune to 
contamination, suspicion and scrutiny’. 
3. The law – laws that are difficult or impossible to enforce, and where 
there is limited public support for enforcement, can provide the 
conditions that lead to corruption. Such laws need to be examined and 
changed.  
12. Cultivate culture intolerant of corruption 
Graycar and Prenzler (2013: 57) say that ‘[t]he best sign of organisational 
health and corruption resistance is an inbuilt acceptance that the agency 
insists on high standards of conduct from its employees. Rather than have big 
sticks for when standards are breached, agencies should build a strong 
culture of integrity that pervades the organisation. The foregoing ten points 
are essentially the building blocks of this observation. However, in addition to 
such corruption control, strategies such as improving investigation and 
detection procedures, developing a transparent and fair complaints system, 
establishing robust internal accountability procedures, having clear ethical 
standards and enforcing these, cultivating a culture that is intolerant of 
misconduct refers to the broader question of professionalism and pride in the 
job must be put in place.  
That said, there is some disagreement in the literature over the significance of 
pride in integrity. A common hypothesis is that the more pride police officers 
have in their department, the more ‘resistant’ they will be to corruption. Fear of 
detection, Sherman suggests, appears to be ‘causally prior to pride in 
integrity, at least in police departments in which corruption was once 
widespread’ (Sherman, 1978: 144). On the other hand, there are those writing 
in the field of corporate or business crime, for example, who take the view that 
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deterrence via the threat of prosecution is less likely to have lasting long-term 
benefits than other more persuasive measures aimed at ensuring compliance 
(Braithwaite, 1989).  
While cultivating a culture intolerant of corruption is presented here as 
primarily an internal matter, it also an issue that concerns those outside the 
police organisation, not least political leaders. That is to say, in just the same 
way that general lessons for police organisations point to the importance of 
valuing professional standards at all levels, so it is unlikely that police 
organisations will easily maintain high levels of integrity and conduct if their 
professionalism is denigrated by political leaders. Those outside the police 
service occupying roles in which they have oversight or governance 
responsibilities for policing have responsibilities, akin to police leaders, for the 
establishment and maintenance of a positive image of professional policing.  
13. Establish robust external supervision and 
accountability 
The literature on police corruption is effectively unanimous in pointing to the 
importance of robust external accountability systems as being central to 
corruption control. Thus far we have focused largely on internal systems, but 
there is good reason to believe that any system of corruption control is only as 
good as the external scrutiny systems that exist. There is a vast body of 
literature on police accountability and there is no need to review it here. 
Rather, one can simply point to the five core lessons that appear to emerge 
from an overview of corruption literature. We will return to the issue of police 
accountability in the concluding section.  
 There is considerable evidence that local democratic control over 
policing is crucial both to public trust and confidence and to the 
successful functioning of police departments (Sen, 2010). 
 Significant civilian involvement in review of complaints against the 
police is wanted by both the general public and by individual 
complainants. There is debate and disagreement as the extent of such 
citizen review, but now little demurral from the general principle 
(Bayley, 1991; 1994). 
 There is a significant correlation between complainant satisfaction and 
citizen oversight of complaint investigation (CCRC, 1999; Hayes, 1997; 
Maguire and Corbett, 1991). 
 Independent Commissions of Inquiry have proved important vehicles 
both for the uncovering of corruption and for the establishment of 
reformed police departments. 
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 Civil society organisations, including media organisations, can play an 
important role in police reform efforts (Transparency International, 
2012). 
Building on evidence that suggests that police agencies with significant 
corruption problems tend to have inadequate internal control systems, Kutnjak 
Ivkovic (2005) argues it is vital to have external bodies that control the police 
institution’s control efforts. Whilst it might be thought that local police oversight 
bodies (city mayors, police authorities, police and crime commissioners) might 
reasonably play this role, Kutnjak Ivkovic argues that there are inevitably a 
variety of tensions that might mitigate the effectiveness of such a relationship. 
Similarly, other bodies such as investigative journalists, specialist 
commissions of inquiry and even citizen oversight panels all have 
shortcomings. In short, she says, current oversight tends to be ‘assigned to 
institutions that are temporary (e.g., independent commissions) or sporadic 
(e.g., the media), institutions whose focus is either too wide or too narrow 
(e.g., the mayor), or institutions that at best have the authority to examine only 
some elements of the agency’s control system (e.g. citizen reviews)’ (2005: 
157). The challenge is to design an institution, or set of institutions, that will 
effectively be able to oversee and control the police agency’s control system 
as a whole on a continuous basis.  
14. Detect and investigate corruption not investigated 
by the police agency 
Successful corruption control also requires the investigation of corruption that 
is not, or is not adequately, investigated by the police agency. As with the 
previous point, once again there are likely to be a number of individuals or 
agencies involved in such work – lawyers, investigative journalists, individual 
citizens and citizen groups – again the likelihood is that such activity will be 
sporadic rather than continuous. The challenge is to design an institution/set 
of institutions that will tackle this problem more coherently, and one of the 
more radical proposals is for the establishment of a new institution called an 
‘integrity-enhancing agency’ (IEA) that would become an integral element of 
the corruption control system. Its function would be the exclusive one of 
‘securing oversight over the police agency, continually monitoring its 
performance, and providing feedback about it’ (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005: 180).  
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15. Disseminate information about corruption and its 
control  
Finally in this regard, and linking back to research evidence on public 
confidence and trust in policing and its clear links with procedural justice, 
there are strong arguments for the dissemination of information about corrupt 
practices. Although, understandably, there will be those that believe that 
increased publicity around misconduct would be likely to undermine public 
confidence, there are good reasons for thinking that the collection and 
circulation of robust information about misconduct is an important part of the 
control effort. Such information provides evidence as to the scale of the 
problem, it indicates that the police agency (and others) take the problem 
seriously and do not hide from it and, when the information concerns the 
investigation, detection and punishment of wrongdoing, provides some basis 
for deterring misconduct and enhancing integrity. Both the police service and 
external oversight bodies have responsibilities in this regard.  
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5. Conclusion 
The lessons from the major corruption inquiries – from the United States and 
Australia in particular but reinforced by research and inquiries elsewhere – 
points to four general and long-standing lessons. These are that: 
 scandal, and official public inquiries set up in the aftermath of scandals, 
can play a vital role in the establishment of successful corruption 
control strategies;  
 although it may appear hard to tackle, corruption, including widespread 
and institutionalised corruption, can be significantly reduced if the right 
conditions prevail and the appropriate strategies are adopted;  
 however, even in a ‘successfully reformed’ police agency, some low 
level corruption is likely to persist; and  
 crucially, without extreme vigilance more organised corruption is likely 
to re-appear.  
Police organisations inevitably carry the heaviest burden in corruption control. 
This will continue to be the case and the literature suggests that although 
there are no ‘silver bullets’, there are a variety of internal reforms that are 
associated with improved corruption control. In particular, the establishment 
and enforcement of clear rules and regulations regarding misconduct is vital. 
However, this is only one small part of the ‘solution’. The naturally complex 
nature of policing means that the issue of ethics is central to corruption control 
and placing ethical scrutiny at the heart of recruitment and selection 
procedures and within in-service training is vitally important to the 
development of a policing culture that is intolerant of corruption. Such 
intolerance, crucially, requires clear, consistent and robust management, and 
all the evidence points to corruption flourishing where management is lax or 
insufficient. External support is required both to support and foster a culture of 
professional policing, and to provide sufficient resources to maintain robust 
systems of corruption control. For all the internal reform efforts that might be 
operationalised, corruption control is unlikely to be successful without 
significant attention also being paid to external oversight and governance. 
Consequently, it is worth concluding by focusing on the more general nature 
of policing and the means by which it is successfully governed. Once again, 
whilst such issues raise necessary questions about institutional structures and 
powers, the reality is that much of this also boils down to values and ethics – 
that is, what we think we want policing to look like and how we want police 
organisations to operate in a democratic society.  
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As noted earlier in this review there is a huge body of literature on police 
accountability and police governance, and much has been written on the 
subject of so-called democratic policing. Such a notion is often discussed, but 
less often is it defined in any detail.  
It is increasingly the case that reviews of policing now point to crucial values 
underpinning policing. Most commonly in the UK the tendency is to make 
reference to the general principles outlined by Sir Robert Peel in the early 
nineteenth century (see, for example, Transparency International, 2013), or 
updated versions of these principles (Independent Police Commission, 2013). 
Such statements of principle are undoubtedly helpful. It is also useful in 
thinking about the idea of democratic policing to focus on the values taken to 
be central to democracy and to consider how these might be applied to 
policing. Work by Jones and colleagues (Jones et al, 1994; 1996; 2012) has 
identified and applied seven core democratic values, each of which can be 
seen as playing a core role in how policing is organized and governed. In 
short, the seven are as follows:  
 Participation – the ability of citizens to participate in discussion of 
policing policy and practice.  
 Equity – The pattern of policing, and the distribution of policing 
resources, ought to be seen to be fair.  
 Delivery of service – The police should deliver the appropriate 
services (as determined by other criteria) effectively and efficiently. 
 Responsiveness – In determining the order of priorities, the allocation 
of resources between different activities and objectives, and the choice 
of policing methods, the police should be responsive to the views of a 
representative body.  
 Distribution of power – Power to determine policing policy should not 
be concentrated but distributed between a number of different bodies. 
 Information – should be regularly published on all policing matters 
(including misconduct). A representative body should be able to 
engage in a continuing dialogue with the professional managers of the 
police force so as to become better informed and to elicit relevant 
information through a sequence of interactions. 
 Redress – It should be possible for a representative body to dismiss 
an incompetent or corrupt chief officer, or one who exceeds their 
powers. There should be effective means of redress for unlawful or 
unreasonable treatment by individual officers.  
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Together, statements of policing principles and democratic values offer a 
robust and codified means of outlining the general expectations of this 
complex and challenging public service. Within this general context a set of 
institutions, strategies and programmes can be developed which, collectively, 
offer the best chance of preventing systemic police corruption and 
investigating, detecting and punishing those forms of misconduct that do 
arise.  
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